Should the Commodities Futures Trading Commission be replaced by a single administrator?

The original purpose of establishing the Commodity Futures Trading Commission as an "independent" regulatory body was to "insulate" it from some of the more turbulent political currents in Washington.  The Commission consists of five Commissioners, no more than three of whom may be from the same political party.  The complexity and speed of the modern derivatives environment argues for a regulator structured for high efficiency.  Congress is the appropriate venue for making high level political choices.  While statutory implementation also calls for policy trade-offs, the opportunity to submit comments on proposed rules -- which, under the law, must be considered by the regulator -- allows for generous public input to the rule-making process.  Congressional oversight of the agency and judicial review of new rules also militate against the potential bias a single administrator might introduce.  A regulator with a politically divided leadership imposes a second round of political negotiating on the process of implementing a statute, with a corresponding delay and potential diffusion of focus in new regulations.

Would the regulation of derivatives be better served by an agency with a single leader -- perhaps appointed for longer than a single presidential term, such as five or ten years?